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Ample empirical studies in the e-commerce literature have documented that 
the price dispersion in online markets is 1) as large as that in offline markets, 
2) persistent across time, and 3) only partially explained by observed e-
retailers’ attributes. 
 
Buying on the internet market is risky to consumers. First of all, consumers 
and the products they purchase are separated in time. There is a delay in time 
between the time consumers pay and the time they receive the orders. 
Second, consumers and the products they purchase are separated in space. 
Consumers cannot physically touch or examine the products at the point of 
purchase. As such, online markets involve an adoption process based on the 
interaction of consumers’ experiences in the form of references, 
recommendations, word of mouth, etc. The social network externalities 
introduced by the interaction of consumer’s  experiences reduces the risk of 
seller choice and allows some sellers to charge higher prices for even 
homogeneous products. 
 
This research aims to study online market price dispersion from the social 
network externalities perspective. Our model posits that consumers are risk 
averse and assess the risk of having a satisfactory transaction from a seller 
based on the two dimensions of the seller’s social network externalities: 
quantity externality (i.e., the size of the seller’s social network) and quality 
externality (i.e., the satisfactory transaction probability of the seller’s social 
network). We further investigate the moderating effect of product value for 
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consumers on the impact of social network externality on online market 
price dispersion. Our model yields several important propositions which we 
empirically test using data sets collected from eBay. We found that 1) both 
quantity externality and quality externality of social network are salient in 
driving online price dispersion, and 2) the salience of social network 
externality is stronger for purchase behavior in higher value product 
categories. 
 






Estudios empíricos en comercio electrónico han documentado que la 
dispersión de precios en estos mercados es 1) de la misma magnitud que en 
los mercados convencionales, 2) persistente en el tiempo, y 3) sólo 
parcialmente explicada por los atributos observables de los oferentes en 
línea. 
 
Comprar en Internet es riesgoso para los consumidores. Primero, los 
consumidores y los productos están separados temporalmente. Existe un 
rezago de tiempo entre cuando el consumidor paga por el producto y cuando 
lo recibe. Segundo, los consumidores y los productos que compraron están 
separados espacialmente. Es decir, los consumidores no pueden tocar o 
examinar los productos en el punto de compra. En este sentido, los mercados 
electrónicos involucran un proceso de adopción basado en la interacción de 
las experiencias de los consumidores en la forma de referencias y 
recomendaciones. Las externalidades de redes sociales que emergen de la 
interacción de las experiencias de los consumidores reduce el riesgo en la 
selección del vendedor y permite a algunos oferentes en Internet cargar 
precios mayores que la competencia (premios) aún para productos 
homogéneos.  
 
Esta investigación busca estudiar la dispersión de precios en mercados 
electrónicos desde la perspectiva de las externalidades de redes sociales. 
Nuestro modelo propone que los consumidores aversos al riesgo evalúan el 
riesgo de tener una transacción satisfactoria en los mercados en línea 
basados en dos dimensiones de las externalidades de las redes sociales del 
vendedor: la externalidad de cantidad (i.e., el tamaño de la red social del 
vendedor) y la externalidad de calidad (i.e., la probabilidad de tener una 
transacción satisfactoria que se infiere de las opiniones de la red social del 
vendedor). Adicionalmente, investigamos el efecto moderador del valor del 
producto para los consumidores en el impacto de las externalidades de redes Social network externalities and prices dispersion in online markets 
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sociales en la dispersión de precios en el comercio en línea. De nuestro 
modelo se deducen proposiciones importantes que probamos empíricamente 
utilizando información recolectada de eBay. Encontramos que 1) ambas, la 
externalidad de cantidad como la externalidad de calidad de las redes 
sociales son importantes factores para explicar la dispersión de precios en el 
comercio electrónico y 2) la importancia de las externalidades de redes 
sociales es más fuerte en la conducta de compra en las categorías de 
productos de mayor valor.  
 
Palabras Claves: externalidades de redes, dispersión de precios, mercados 
en línea, referencias de palabra. 





Price dispersion for homogeneous products across vendors in online markets 
has attracted much attention. Several stylized facts on online price dispersion 
are well documented in the literature: 
 
Online price dispersion is present in a variety of markets. Bailey (1998), 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Clay, Krishnan and Wolff (2001) and Clay 
et al (2002) have documented variation coefficients (standard deviation as 
proportion of the mean) between 20% and 50%. Clemons et al (2002) 
reported hedonic price regressions in the online travel agencies and 
concluded that even controlling for all relevant tickets attributes, some 
sellers can still charge premium prices in the order of 28%. In the European 
online market of contact lenses, Häring (2003) found dispersion in the range 
of 60% of the mean. For a broad sample of products, Pan et al (2001) 
reported moderate price dispersion for several categories in online 
commerce. 
 
Online price dispersion is of the same magnitude as offline. Price dispersion 
in many offline retailing sectors also ranges from 20% to 30%. For example, 
Lach (2002) estimated a price dispersion of 25% of the mean in grocery 
retailing in Israel, a sector subject to frequent sales specials (high-low 
pricing) and Sorensen (2000) estimated a price dispersion of 22% in the 
pharmacy business. In direct comparisons, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) 
found that price dispersion was larger for the Internet than conventional 
retailing in books and CDs. Sholten and Smith (2002) found no significant 
difference in the price dispersion measures in online and offline vendors in a 




Online price dispersion is persistent even for homogeneous products.  In 
other words, there is no sound signal that price dispersion in online markets 
tends to diminish in time (Lach, 2002). Clay et al (2001) estimated that inter-
temporal price dispersion is close to zero for a sample of more than one 
hundred books.  
 
Researchers have made attempts to address why these stylized facts on price 
dispersion exist in a seemingly frictionless online market. Studies explaining 
online price dispersion focused on product differentiation, buyer 
heterogeneity, and seller heterogeneity (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; 
Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; Pan et al, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Smith, 2002; 
etc.). These studies have made significant progress in understanding the 
drivers of online price dispersion, but they often leave behind a significant 
proportion of the variability of online price dispersion unexplained. 
 
In this paper, we attempt to study online price dispersion from the 
perspective of social network externalities. The idea is that online markets 
convey a consumer adoption process driven by the interaction of consumers’ 
experiences in the form of references, word of mouth, digital word of mouth 
or just imitating behavior. If the firms in online markets recognize that 
consumers understand that their adoption of e-commerce faces risks under 
which the importance of the network approval is high (e.g., use network 
based information sources to make judgment on whether they will have a 
satisfactory online transaction), then the firms’ optimal strategy is to invest 
in building a large consumer base with positive word of mouth in the short 
run and to enjoy price premiums in return in the long run.  
 
Our idea finds support in anecdotic evidence in the e-commerce industry. 
Jeffrey Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, once summarized the key element of 
the success of Amazon: “Repeated purchases and word of mouth have 
combined to make Amazon.com the market leader in online industry”.
 2   
Word of mouth, sharing past purchasing experiences, imitating other 
consumers, and reading the comments other consumers rate the sellers in e-
auctions markets (e.g., eBay) or shopbots (e.g., Bizrate) which involve the 
presence of social network externalities allow firms like Amazon to charge a 
premium price. 
 
Our idea also finds support in e-commerce literature. “Winner takes it all” is 
a widely accepted e-commerce notion in which sales are often concentrated 
in a few large e-retailers for a given industry. As such, Goolsbee and 
Chevalier (2002) using the sales rank measures reported by the major online 
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bookstores estimated that Amazon might sell 70% of the online book market 
whereas B&N might have a market share of 15%. Thus the  remaining  15% 
is shared  among more than 7,000 fringe e-retailers  suggesting that online 
markets at large might be as concentrated as conventional retailing, even in 
commodity markets (such as books).  
 
The study is organized as follows. In Section 1, a review of the related 
literature on online price dispersion and social network externality is 
presented. Section 2 presents our modeling framework. We posit that 
consumers are presented with risk of an unsatisfactory transaction in online 
markets. Consumers do not know the true probability of a satisfactory 
transaction from a particular seller and have to rely on estimations they make 
based on other consumers´ word of mouth, digital word of mouth,
 3  or 
behavior. We further derive five testable hypotheses from our modeling 
framework, concerning both the quantity externality of social network (i.e., 
the social network size) and quality externality of social network (i.e., the 
satisfactory transaction probability) for sellers. In section 3, our hypotheses 
are empirically tested using data collected from e-Bay. Finally, the 
implications of the study, its limitations and some opportunities for further 
research are discussed.  
 
 
1. Literature Review 
 




One stream of research focuses on how product differentiation dilutes price 
competition and allows price dispersion. This literature suggests that buying 
via the Internet might decrease price elasticity if the products are 
differentiated and the search attributes of the products are important in 
consumers’ choice decisions. The reason is that Internet lowers not only the 
search costs for price, but also the search costs for other product attributes. 
As such, the price competition is often counterbalanced by product 
competition. Using experiments, Lynch and Ariely (2000) found that the 
lowering search costs makes differentiation on product quality more salient 
than that on price and hence decrease price sensitivity in electronic markets. 
 
In a broader framework, Degeratu et al (2000) further argue that the 
counterbalance of product competition on price competition triggered by 
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lowering search costs in electronic markets depends on the types of product 
attributes. They propose that the Internet lowers the search cost of non-
sensory attributes (e.g., the content of fat in margarine), but increases the 
search costs of sensory attributes (e.g., the softness of paper towels). As 
such, we might expect less intense price competition among brands in 
electronic markets for products where sensory attributes are important to 
consumers. In these cases, brand might act as a surrogate of sensory 
attributes in consumer choice in online markets, which increases market 
concentration and decreases price sensitivity. Using an online shopping 
behavior data set from peapod.com, the authors found empirical support for 
their hypotheses. 
 
A more theoretical treatment was given by Bakos (1997). He built a 
theoretical model of monopolistic competition in which each producer has a 
monopoly of one variety, but all varieties are close substitutes. The model 
suggests that as the Internet reduces the costs of information search about 
product quality, instead of making the market more competitive, the Internet 
reinforces the “monopoly” of each seller in its particular variety. As such it 
decreases price sensitivity of consumers.  
 
This stream of research offers some important insights on why lowering 
search costs does not necessarily enforce price competition and often allows 
price dispersion among differentiated products in online markets. However, 
for homogeneous products, the search for non-price related product attributes 
(e.g., product quality) does not exist. As such, this literature is short in 





A second stream of research on online price dispersion for homogenous 
products focuses on buyer heterogeneity. This literature suggests that a 
persistent price dispersion arises if consumers have different search costs 
(Salop and Stiglitz, 1977), buy different quantities (Salop and Stiglitz, 1982), 
have different exposures to advertisement (Butters, 1977), or have different 
awareness (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Brown and Goosbee, 2001; 
Smith, 2002). 
 
A well known scenario is when there are two segments of consumers for the 
homogeneous products: one segment (“shoppers”) has low search costs and 
the other (“non-shoppers”) has high search costs. A Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies occurs with unequal prices for the same product in which shoppers 
make an exhaustive search and buy at the lowest price and non-shoppers do 
not engage in this process and buying the same product with a premium. For Social network externalities and prices dispersion in online markets 
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price dispersion to be persistent, however, these models require that 
consumers are amnesic (each period they reset their previous experience), 
and/or that consumers do not communicate among themselves (to ask 
references and learn from others). In other words, the market should 
resemble the one in which new consumers enter with high search costs and 
others remain with low search costs (e.g., tourists versus locals). However, if 
consumers communicate with each other, a Nash equilibrium with persistent 
price dispersion is still sustainable in mixed strategies. The problem was 
studied initially by Varian (1980) and further generalized by Stahl (1989). 
The randomness of the mixed strategy makes the communication among 
consumers ineffective for them to make price judgment for particular sellers.  
 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) suggest consumer awareness heterogeneity as 
a driver for online price dispersion. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) assume that 
the consideration set of most of the consumers is restricted to well known 
insurance vendors, and only a very small proportion of agents are aware of 
the whole market suppliers. Smith (2002) built a theoretical model for the 
online book industry, in which three kinds of consumers are identified 
depending on their awareness level. Segment one is only aware of the 
branded online retailers in the book industry (Amazon, Barnes & Noble and 
Borders), segment two is aware of these big players as well as some of the 
“fringe” online bookstores, and segment three consists of shopbot users who 
always seek the lowest price alternative. At equilibrium, branded retailers 
play a cooperative solution in a repeated game framework of posting the 
same price and fringe retailers play a randomize-price Varian (1980) strategy 
which precludes consumers to fully be aware of the whole price distribution 
across vendors. This line of research finds empirical support in some 
markets. For example, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) present empirical 
evidence from the insurance industry. They find that after controlling for all 
relevant variables in a hedonic price regression of insurance policies, a clear 
tendency of narrowing price premiums and intensifying competition has 
occurred as a consequence of appearance of insurance prices comparison 
web sites (a kind of insurance shopbots). 
 
This literature provides an interesting explanation for online price dispersion, 
but it comes with some important shortcomings. First, intertemporal price 
dispersions of online markets (i.e., the variation of particular seller’s prices 
across time) are small, suggesting that randomized high-low price strategies 
are not a critical determinant of price dispersion. Actually, most of the sellers 
usually offer the same price for long periods of time. Second, Salop and 
Stiglitz (1977, 1982) model might explain price dispersion without random-
price strategies, but as the proportion of low-cost shoppers increases (e.g. 
shopbots users), eventually price dispersion should decrease. However, there 
is no direct evidence about such price convergence process. Third, a no Ensayos 
 
8 
concentrated market results from the price dispersion in the Varian (1980) or 
Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982) models, what seems to be a strong stylized 
fact in online markets experience. 
 
While the Smith model (2002) on consumer awareness is a nice theoretical 
step in explaining price dispersion, it does not explain how the different 
levels of awareness were formed in the first place. Moreover it lacks face-
validity about the fringe prices, because book prices on the Internet are 
relatively stable, a fact that contradicts that fringe vendors use random-price 
strategies. Additionally, Brynjolfsson and Smith’s (2000) study of consumer 
behavior in a particular shopbot showed that even when shopbot consumers 
are very price sensitive, brand still matters, since 51% of shopbot consumers 
did not choose the lowest price alternative. Actually, in their study, even 
when brand sites had the lowest prices only 15% of times, they captured a 




A third stream of research focuses on the attribution of the seller 
heterogeneity on key attributes such as reliability, trust guarantees, handling 
and shipping policies, attractiveness of the interface, etc. The argument on 
seller heterogeneity for online price dispersion is appealing, but the attempts 
find limited evidence that such measurable attributes explain a significant 
portion of price dispersion. For example, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) 
found that the coefficients of these measurable attributes in hedonic price 
regressions are usually neither significantly different from zero nor having 
the correct signs. Also, Pan et al (2001, 2002a, 2002b) found four factors -- 
reliability, shopping convenience, product information, shipping and 
handling – that synthesize all measurable service attributes of e-retailers. 
Again, these factors did not explain price variability well in hedonic 
regressions. 
 
There are several important shortcomings in this line of research. First, the 
attempts to analyze online price dispersion from sellers’ heterogeneity 
(Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Pan et al, 2002a) lack a theoretical 
foundation in which the mechanism that the sellers’ heterogeneity attributes 
to consumers’ willingness to pay is described. Second, this literature fails to 
take into account an important endogenous variable that reflects the 
deviation from pure competition: market concentration. Indeed, price 
dispersion might be a direct consequence of the fact that online sales are 
very concentrated in few vendors. For example, in the case of the online 
bookstore industry, it is evident that Amazon is the undisputable leader. 
Third, market concentration carries unequal weighting on consumer decision 
making. For example, consumers may prefer shopping from Amazon.com Social network externalities and prices dispersion in online markets 
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than from a fringe retailer even though the two firms have identical average 
reliability rating. Methodologically, ignoring market concentration implicitly 
puts equal weight on each seller (e.g., Bizrate.com).  
 
We propose a theoretical framework on price dispersion in which these 
remedies are addressed from the perspective of social network externalities.  
 
1.2 Social Network Externality 
 
“Network Externality” refers to the change of value a consumer derives from 
a product when the number of other consumers adopting the same product 
changes (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
 
Network externality can be direct or indirect, depending upon how the 
consumption value is changed (e.g., Economides, 1996). A direct network 
externality occurs when the addition of a new consumer to the current 
consumers of the product (or the network) presents a new potential 
composite product which can be consumed by and thus changes the 
consumption value of some consumers in the network. For example, in 
telephone market, adding a new subscriber to a phone network presents new 
phone service possibility for the current subscribers and therefore changes 
the value of subscribers’ using the phone services (e.g., many mobile phone 
services providers such as Sprint, Nextel etc. market their products by 
offering unlimited mobile to mobile services). The indirect network 
externality occurs when the change of value is attributed to sources other 
than the number of composite products, such as compatibility, quality, 
learning, diversity etc. For example, consumers might be inclined to use the 
more popular software packages because they can transfer files with more 
people (compatibility). Consumers also are more prone to acquire the most 
purchased software because it is more likely to be updated (quality). In 
addition, consumers find that it is more convenient to purchase the most 
popular software because it is easier to find support of experienced users 
(learning). For example, Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) showed evidence 
of the presence of indirect network externalities in the use of software 
packages, because investing time in learning the dominant software is more 
profitable given the higher probability of being updated compared with less 
popular software. Also, Goolsbee and Klenow (1999) showed that the 
diffusion of home computers exhibits strong indirect network externalities as 
well, mainly through learning but perhaps also because of status-seeking 
behavior. 
 
Social networks have been widely studied in marketing. Marketing 
researchers used social network externality to study diffusion of innovations 
and new products. Bass (1969) assumes that imitators’ utility grows as the Ensayos 
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size of the adopted population (or network size) increases. Although Bass 
(1969) does not explicitly specify the way the network externality operates, 
the inference of the model, however, suggests two possible impacts of social 
network externality for diffusion. First, diffusion requires necessity of 
communication and exchange of information of the individuals who are 
linked through a social network (e.g., word of mouth). Bass (1980) and 
Clarke, Darrough and Heineke’s (1982) address the “experience” effects on 
demand and costs, willingness to pay depends on the learning of all 
consumers, because “experience” spills across consumers. 
 
Second, the network externalities operate mostly through risk reduction of 
adoption, particularly in risk-sensitive markets. For example, Oren and 
Swartz (1988) assume consumers learn in a Bayesian approach. Consumers 
are heterogeneous in risk bearing. The diffusion process operates through the 
interaction of the outcome variance of the adopters and the size of adopters. 
As the higher risk bearing individuals become adopters, they reduce the 
uncertainty of the rest of the consumers. This consequently allows lower risk 
bearing consumers to adopt. Roberts and Urban (1988) also imposed 
Bayesian updating of consumers´ beliefs. As the size of the adopters segment 
grows, the variance of the outcome decreases and the certain equivalent 
increases. If there is no satiation, then the larger the network size, the higher 
the expected utility of consumers. Lattin and Roberts (2000) extended 
Roberts and Urban (1988) model to take into account other possible 
transmission channels of network externalities, specifically conformism and 
social pressure. They implemented a practical method of estimating diffusion 
models to new products just prior to the launch. 
 
In summary, social network externality offers a theoretical foundation in 
approaching the aggregate on price and market structure when the market 
has a salient presence of network externalities. Online markets post a strong 
presence of (indirect) social network externality. For example, in online 
banking market, Kennickell and Kwast (1997) found that 33% of the 
consumers admit that their adoption decision was influenced by their friends 
and family members who had adopted online banking. Some other 27% of 
the consumers were influenced by financial consultants and brokers. We 
develop our model along these lines next. 
 
 
2. Modeling Framework and Hypothesis Development 
 
Economides and Siow (1988) and Economides (1993) introduce an indirect 
network externality in the context of financial markets: the liquidity effect. 
According to these studies, prices are less volatile in more liquid financial 
markets (with a high volume of daily transactions) than in thin financial Social network externalities and prices dispersion in online markets 
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markets (with a low volume of daily transactions). This is true because high 
volume of transactions suggests a reduced risk of trading.  
 
We posit that this liquidity proposition happens in online markets and drives 
the online price dispersion, much the same way as “reputation liquidity” 
works in financial markets. The risk of a transaction in an online market is 
high. First, consumers and the products are separated in time. There is a 
delayed time between the time consumer pays and the time he or she 
receives the order. Second, consumers and the products are separated in 
space. Consumers cannot physically touch or examine the products at the 
point of purchase. Consumers assess seller’s ability to guaranty a satisfactory 
transaction through word of mouth (comments and evaluations of other 
consumers to a seller) in online markets. The size and quality of the 
electronic references about a seller in online markets lower the variance and 
the risk of buying from a seller and help to build up consumer trust. The 
built-up sellers’ reputation allows some sellers to charge price premium over 
others, which attributes to the online price dispersion.  
 
2.1 Modeling Framework 
 
We assume a consumer has utility value v for a product purchased from an e-
retailer if the transaction is satisfactory (i.e., the consumer gets what she 
wants on time). However, in electronic markets, consumers often involve a 
risk for unsatisfactory transaction due to poor performance of the e-retailers. 
An unsatisfactory delivery occurs if consumers do not receive the product on 
time, receive the wrong product, receive the correct product but in poor 
condition, or receiving nothing at all. This potential uncertainty of 
unsatisfactory delivery scales down the expected utility for the customers. 
 
Assume the probability that a satisfactory delivery for the e-retailer isλ . 
Then the expected utility of the transaction is  v λ  if the consumer is risk-
neutral. The consumer evaluates the e-retailer performance by observing 
other consumers´ behaviors and feedbacks, and assesses the satisfactory 
transaction probabilityλ  from the e-retailer. For example, “herd” behavior, 
in which rumors, fads, and fashion models lead the way (Banerjee, 1992 y 
1993) suggests consumers infer the performance of e-retailers by observing 
where and how many other consumers purchase. On the other hand, digital 
word-of-mouth coming from reputation mechanisms as the one implemented 
by the eBay Rating Score, the “stars” rating systems of most of shopbots, 
and the plain text comments of unknown consumers who had a positive or 
negative experience with particular e-retailers etc. acts as another important 




Assume that there are M references in which x references are positive. Also 
assume that the consumer assesses the e-retailer’s satisfactory transaction 
probability  λ  via the sampling positive reference ratio 
M
x s = .  M 
approximates the consumer’s social network size at the e-retailer because it 
is the estimation consumers often use to infer the true social network size.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that random variable s follows a binomial 
distribution with a population proportionλ . For large M, s will be an 
unbiased estimator ofλ . The binomial distribution assumption is convenient 
for two reasons. First, the binomial distribution is appropriate for the 
references to the e-retailer because it is restricted to either positive (1) or 
negative (0). This binary classification of references is the very procedure 
adopted by the majority of reputation mechanisms in electronic markets such 
as the eBay Feedback Score. Second, a binomial distribution is a natural 
choice for facilitating a proportion estimator. As such, for a risk neutral 
consumer, the estimated expected utility will be sv. 
 
However, consumers are not risk-neutral, but rather risk averse, whether they 
shop online or offline. The e-commerce has well documented that one of the 
biggest problem for consumers to avoid online shopping is the high risk 
when shopping in online markets. As in standard treatment of uncertainty in 
economics literature, we assume a risk adjusted utility function as   
() sv U U = . For risk-averse consumers, the utility function is concave and 
has the properties  ( ) 0 ´ ≥ sv U and ( ) 0 ´´ ≤ sv U . A second degree Taylor 
expansion of  () sv U  shows: 
 
 
As such, the maximum price p consumers are willing to pay is equal to the 
expected risk-adjusted utility, i.e.,  
 
 
For large M, equation (2) is a good estimation for maximum price consumers 
are willing to pay (Economides and Siow 1988). Since  ( ) 0 < • ′ ′ U , equation 
(2) suggests that the expected utility  )] ( [ sv U E  with uncertainty is lower 
than the expected utility without uncertainty ) ( v U λ . The difference 
depends on the risk aversion of consumers (reflected by  ( ) 0 < • ′ ′ U ) and the 
() ()( )()( ) () v U
v sv
v U v sv v U sv U λ
λ
λ λ λ ′ ′ −
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) 1 ( λ λ . We derive some important hypotheses 
from our modeling framework next. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
For the tractability of developing testable hypotheses, we follow the network 
economy literature (e.g., Economides and Siow, 1988) and use a Cobb-
Douglas utility function to capture consumer risk aversion:  
 
 





β β sv U  and 
2 ) )( 1 (
− − = ′ ′
β β β sv U  respectively, which satisfy the risk aversion conditions 
for () 1 , 0 ∈ β . This specification has some advantages: 1) it simplifies the 
mathematical derivation; 2) it involves a decreasing absolute risk aversion 
coefficient that has face validity; and 3) it implies a constant relative risk 
aversion coefficient that makes empirical analysis more applicable.
4 With 
specification (3), equation (2) becomes 
 
 
We use equation (4) to develop some testable hypotheses regarding the 
impact on price dispersion from social network externalities and the 
moderating effect of product value for consumers.  
 
Quantity Externality of Social Network 
 
We first develop hypotheses regarding the quantity impact of seller’s social 
network externality (i.e., the impact of sellers’ social network size) on price 
dispersion. Assume that seller 1 has the same satisfactory transaction 
probability as seller 2, but larger network size. A consumer’s estimate of the 
satisfactory transaction probability is more precise for seller 1 than for seller 
2. Consequently, a consumer is willingness to pay a price premium to seller 
1. Indeed,  
 
                                                 











) 1 ( β  
in the Cobb-Douglas case. The relative risk aversion is the absolute coefficient times the 
argument, which results simply in  β − 1  for the Cobb-Douglas specification. 
[]
β sv sv U = ) ( ( )  0,1 with β ∈   (3)
[]
M
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which is positive because  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ β  and  2 1 M M > . We have, 
 
H1: Other things being fixed, having a larger social network allows a seller 
to charge a higher price premium. As such, the impact of quantity externality 
of social network is positive on price dispersion. 
 
The rate at which price premium increases with network size is a decreasing 
function of the absolute network sizes. In other words, the effect of network 
sizes on price premiums is diminishing. Regrouping (15), we obtain, 
 
 
which is positive but decreasing in M1 or M2. As such, we have 
 
H2: Other things being fixed, having a larger social network allows a seller 
to charge a higher price premium at a diminishing rate. As such, the impact 
of quantity externality of social network on price dispersion increases at a 
diminishing rate. 
 
Quality Externality of Social Network 
 
We next develop hypotheses regarding the quality impact of sellers’ social 
network externality (i.e., the impact of sellers’ satisfactory transaction 
probability) on price dispersion. If seller 1 has a higher satisfactory 
transaction probability than seller 2, then the price premium a consumer is 
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The first term in the expression is positive since 2 1 λ λ > . The second term is 






















1 , which is true since 2 1 λ λ >  and 
) 1 , 0 ( , 2 1 ∈ λ λ . As such, we have 
 
H3: Other things being fixed, having a higher satisfactory transaction 
probability allows a seller to charge a higher price premium. As such, the 
impact of quality externality of social network is positive on price dispersion. 
 
The Moderating Effect of Product Value for Consumers 
 
Our next two hypotheses address the moderating effect of product value for 
consumers on the impact of social network externality on price dispersion. 
Assume A is a high-value product such as an LCD or Plasma TV and B is a 
low-value product such as a DVD movie, i.e.,  B A v v > . The rate of change 
of price premiums with respect to network sizes for product A and B follows 
the same expression as in (6). Holding other things constant, the ratio of 
rates of changes is: 
 
 
which is larger than one when  B A v v > . The rationale is that an increase in 
the product value increases the variance of the outcome so that the impact of 
the network externality on price premiums increases. As such, we have 
 
H4: Other things being fixed, having a larger social network allows a seller 
to charge a higher price premium when selling higher valued products. As 
such, the impact of quantity externality of social network on price dispersion 





φ  represents the rate of price change with respect to the seller’s satisfactory 
transaction probability change. To compare the rate of change φ  for 



































































1 > γ  for  B A v v > . The rationale of the result is that the expected utility and 
the variance of a transaction are larger for the high-value product A than for 
the low-value product B, which allows a larger impact on sellers’ 
satisfactory transaction probability. As such, we have the following 
hypothesis addressing the moderating effect of product value for consumers 
regarding the impact of quality externality of social networks on price 
dispersion: 
 
H5: Other things being fixed, having a higher satisfactory transaction 
probability allows a seller to charge higher price premium. As such, the 
impact of quality externality of social network on price dispersion is more 
salient for higher-valued products. 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 Online Market and product selection 
 
We select eBay auction market as the e-market to conduct our empirical 
analysis. This selection is based on the following important consideration: 1) 
eBay enforces accurate registrations and hence the feedbacks generated by 
all operations held by a specific account. This is different from other retailer 
evaluations reported at shopbots (e.g., epinion.com, Bizrate.com etc.) in 
which the shopbots only report the results of those who want to complete the 
evaluation form which often contains the “promotional chat” from marketers 
(Mayzlin, 2006). 2) eBay auctions are a proper mechanism to reveal demand 
properties.  The supply is fixed (completely inelastic) and consumer bids 
reveal their willingness to pay since eBay auctions are English auctions and 
winning bids fully reveal the second highest willingness to pay. 3) eBay 
Scores or Reputation Mechanisms about sellers, create good proxies for 
network sizes and satisfaction transaction probability assessment with 
sufficient variations allowing credible estimations. 
 
We collected two samples of eBay auctions with two considerations. First, 
product value for consumers, which is operationalized on the total costs 
consumers incur to acquire the products:  product price and product purchase 
involvement (i.e. the opportunity cost of the time involved in searching, 
learning, comparing among products and sellers). As such, the low price and 
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low involvement products are taken as low-value products whereas the high 
price and high involvement products are taken as high-value products. 
Second, estimation appropriateness, which is operationalized on selecting 
products in which products exhibit little differentiation across auctions to 
minimize the impact of product differentiation on price dispersion and are 
highly traded to assure a good sample size to minimize the impact on price 
dispersion of sample bias and errors. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
 
To test our hypotheses, we consider a simple linear specification 
 
 
where  j P  is the price,  j N is the quantity externality of social network (i.e., 
network size ) and  j r  is the quality externality of social network (i.e., 
satisfactory transaction probability ) for e-retailer j, and  j u  is random error 
with  0 ] [ = j u E , constant variance and null serial correlation between any pair 
of auctions. This specification is appropriate because the dependent variable 
is exactly the price premium that is commanded by seller j. A log-linear 
relationship between price premiums and with network size was assumed to 
allow for the marginal diminishing effect of network sizes. The model allows 
other controlling variables such as the end day and hour of the auction, 
which are omitted for the sake of notation simplicity.  
 
Other alternative specifications such as using the logarithm of the price 
premium or the traditional double-log specification in most hedonic prices 
applications
5 can also be applied. However, the rate of change of price 
premiums to changes in network sizes and satisfactory transaction 
probability are highly non-linear and depend on the actual values of the 
variables involved. As such, these alternative specifications make it harder to 
statically test the hypotheses and are not considered further. 
 
Consider two sellers j and k with k j N N ≥  and  k j r r ≥ , then subtracting 
) ( j k P Min P − from equation (11):  
 
                                                 
5  Specifically the variants are  ( ) j j j o j j u r N P Min P Log + + + = − 2 1 ) log( ) ( β β β  and 
j j j o j u r N P Log + + + = 2 1 ) log( ) ( β β β  
j j j o j j u r N P Min P + + + = − 2 1 ) log( ) ( β β β (11)




Thus, other things being fixed, the higher the difference in social network 
sizes, the higher the price premium seller j can charge above seller k, as long 
as  0 1 > β  (H1). By the same token, other things being fixed, the higher the 
difference in the satisfactory transaction probability, the higher the price 
premium seller j can charge above seller k, as long as  0 2 > β  (H3).  
 
To examine H2, it is necessary to form the rate of change of price premiums 
to network sizes. For simplicity, assume both sellers have equal satisfactory 
transaction probability, differing only in the network sizes. By definition, the 
rate of change of price premiums to network sizes is: 
 
 
Take the first derivative of the rate of change of price premiums respect the 
Network size of the e-retailer j: 
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x  for ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ x , thus 
) (x Δ is an increasing function of  x , i.e.  0 ) 1 ( ) ( = Δ ≤ Δ x  for  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ x . Thus, 




μ , i.e. μ  is a decreasing function of 
Nj, which is H2. 
 
H4 and H5 involve the moderating effects of product value for consumers on 
the impacts of quantity externality and quality externality of social network 
on price dispersion respectively. Holding constant the network sizes of 
sellers j and k across the product H (high-value) and product L (low-value), 
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Thus, to be consistent with H4,  L H 1 1 β β >  is required. Similarly, the ratio 




Hence, in order to be consistent with H5, it is necessary that  L H 2 2 β β > . 
 
In conclusion, estimations are consistent with the hypotheses H1-H5 if the 
coefficients of network size and the satisfactory transaction probability are 1) 
both positive and 2) respectively larger for high-value product than for low-
value product. 
 
3.3 Description of the products and samples 
 
We choose the popular T.V. show “Lost” DVD box sets as the low value 
product. We restrict our product to the 2
nd season and new sets only. We 
selected the 4 GB Blue Apple Nano iPod as the high value product. Again, 
we restrict our product to the new product and in blue color, since it was the 
most popular by that time, only. Data collection timing is the only different 
attribute among auctions in these two samples. The TV show sample was 
collected in October 2006 and April 2007 while the iPod sample was 
collected in November 2006, January and February 2007.  
 
The TV show sample consisted of 415 auctions. The average final price bid 
of these auctions was $27.2 with a standard deviation of $5.2, meaning a 
variation coefficient of 19.1%.  
 
The quantity externality of social network for a seller is measured by the 
seller’s total transactions. Its frequency distribution is asymmetrical, with a 
long tail to the right, suggesting that few suppliers have high network sizes. 
The mean of the distribution is close to six thousand transactions but its 
standard deviation is three times larger than the mean. The quality 
externality of social network is measured by the ratio of positive customer’s 
opinions in total transactions.  This reputation score is high and shows small 
dispersions towards the mean. For the TV show sample the mean of positive 
opinions is 0.99 with a standard deviation of 0.01. The apparent 
overestimation of the quality of sellers is a stylized fact of eBay´s reputation 
system that has been discussed in Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002). One 








































each other for a single auction. As such, buyers may not report negative 
feedbacks for fear of retaliation (Avery et al, 1999).  
 
The Apple 4 GB Nano iPod sample consists of 147 auctions. The mean price 
of this equipment was $183 with a standard deviation of $19.2 (10.5% of the 
mean). The quantity externality of social network mean is around two 
thousand transactions with a large standard deviation equal to 1.5 times of 
the mean. As in the case of the low value product, the distribution has a 
salient positive skew. The quality externality of social network is 0.99 with a 
standard deviation of 0.01. The descriptive statistics of both samples are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the eBay Data Set 
 
 Mean  Std.  Deviation 
The TV Show Sample    
Control Variables   
April 0.7133 0.4528 
Prices    
Final Bid Price  27.24  5.24* 
Price Premium 17.29  5.24* 
Social Network Externality     
Quantity 5799.88 16286.2 
Quality 0.9953 0.0116 
The Ipod  Sample    
Control Variables     
January 0.2517 0.4355 
February 0.0884 0.2849 
Prices    
Final Bid Price 182.99  19.21* 
Price Premium 87.99  19.21* 
Social Network Externality     
Quantity 2009 3043.84 
Quality 0.9948 0.0118 





Since products are homogeneous, there is no control variable for product 
differentiation. However, to further control the time difference of the 
samples, we specify time dummies in model estimations.  
 
Table 2 present the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of the model 
(11) for each of the samples separately with the month dummy variables. Social network externalities and prices dispersion in online markets 
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The simple linear model fits both samples reasonably well, with goodness-
of-fit 0.20 for the TV Show sample and 0.54 for the iPod sample 
respectively. In both cases, the control variable coefficients for the months 
are significant at 0.01. The results suggest that the price of second season of 
the TV Show was $5.21 lower in April 2007 compared with October 2006. 
A similar decreasing price trend occurs in the case of the iPods. Prices were 
$21.30 lower in January 2007 than in November 2006 and $24.73 lower in 
February 2007 than in November 2006.  The coefficients of quantity and 
quality of social network externalities are both positive and significant at 




OLS Estimation of Price Premiums Equation 
 
 Coefficient  Std.  Error 
The TV Show Sample    
Control Variables     
Constant -25.53 19.92 
April      -5.21**  0.52 
Social Network Externality    
 
Quantity  
  0.31** 0.1 
 
Quality  
  44.81* 20.03 
Goodness-of-Fit    
R-Square 0.2   
The Ipod Sample    
Control Variables     
Constant -176.33 92.68 
January      -21.3**  2.71 
February       -24.73**  4.05 
Social Network Externality    
 
Quantity  
        2.97**  0.57 
Goodness-of-Fit    
R-Square  0.54   
*   Significant at 0.05 
** Significant at 0.01 
 
Similarly, a direct observation again shows the face validity of H4 and H5. 
For example, the seller’s social network coefficient of the iPod sample is 9.6 
L 1 β
L 2 β
H 1 βEnsayos 
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times (2.97:0.31) the TV show DVD box set coefficient. In addition, every 
10% increase on the satisfactory transaction probability for a seller would 
allow the seller to charge just $4.45 more for the TV Show (44.81*0.10) and 
$25.47 more for the iPod (254.74*0.1). 
 
In order to test H4 and H5 directly, a system of equations is employed. We 
use two approaches: Pooling regression and Seemingly Unrelated 
Relationships (SUR) Method to control any possible correlation between the 
residuals for low and high value auctions occasioned by unobserved 
common factors to all eBay auctions.  
 
The pooled OLS estimates are reported in the first two columns of Table 3. 
Again, the coefficients of control variables resemble those in the individual 
sample estimation. The coefficients of quantity externality and quality 
externality are both positive and significant for the TV Show sample, 
confirming our hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. Moreover, the estimates show 
that the impact of quantity externality is more than ten times larger for the 
iPod sample than for the TV Show sample, and the impact of quality 
externality is 70% larger for the iPod sample than for the TV Show sample. 
 
The Wald test for the moderating effect on the impact of quantity externality 
is 50.26, which is significant at 0.01. The Wald test
 for the moderating effect 
on the impact of quality externality is 465.47 which is also significant at 
0.01. Both tests confirm that the coefficients of quantity and quality 
externality are indeed larger for the high-value product than that for the low-
value product (H4 and H5).  
 
We present the SUR estimates in the final two columns of Table 3. Similar 
to the pooled OLS estimates, all coefficients are significant at 0.01, and have 
the expected signs. The magnitudes of the estimates are similar to those of 
pooled OLS estimates as well.  The coefficients of quantity externality are 
0.31 and 3 for the low-value and high-value samples respectively, rendering 
a ratio of approximately 1:10 across samples. The ratio of the quality 
externality coefficients is 1:2.12 across samples. As the coefficients of both 
quality and quantity externalities are positive and significant at 0.01, 
hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are again supported. The Wald χ
2 statistic for 
testing H4 is 22.18 with a p<0.01, suggesting that quantity externality is 
larger for the high value product. The Wald χ
2 statistic for testing H5 is 
200.36, significant at 0.01. Therefore, H5 is strongly supported. In summary, 
the results suggest that our hypotheses H1 – H5 are strongly supported 
empirically.  
 




Pooling and SUR Estimations of Price Premiums Equation 
 
 Pooled  Method  SUR  Method 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Control Variables         
Constant -66.08* 28.56  -32.5  19.47 
April -5.3** 0.88  -5.23**  0.52 
January -21.27** 1.61 -21.17** 2.68 
February -24.34** 2.4 -24.24**  3.98 
 
Social Network Externality 
 
Quantity  












  143.81** 28.84 109.87** 20 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
R-Square (TV Show) 0.2  0.2   
R-Square (Ipod) 0.54  0.53 
*   Significant at 0.05 





In this research, we attempted to understand the impact of social network 
externalities on price dispersion in online markets. Buying in the Internet 
market often involves risks in both space and time: 1) a delayed time 
between the time consumer pays and the time he or she receives the order 
(Will I get my product at all? Will I get my product at the expected date?), 
and 2) the product and the consumers are spatially separated so that a careful 
product check is often impossible (Will I get what I wanted?)
6 As such, 
                                                 







consumers rely on online social interaction such as word-of-mouth, 
recommendations etc. to reduce the associated risk in their purchase decision 
making.  The heterogeneity of degree of risk reduction results in 
heterogeneity of price premium paid by consumers, which attributes to the 
price dispersion in online markets. 
 
In the demand model consumers are uncertain about whether the e-vendors 
can make a satisfactory transaction. Consumers are risk averse and they try 
to assess the probability of satisfactory transaction of the web sites through 
interaction with other e-shoppers. Social network externalities operate 
through the assessment process in two different ways: the quality externality 
anchors the location of the assessment and the quantity externality reduces 
the variance of the assessment. Consumers are willing to pay a higher price 
premium for those sellers who exhibit higher quality externality as well as 
higher quantity externality at a diminishing way.  However, such willingness 
to pay is likely to exhibit asymmetric effect for some moderating factors 
such as consumer product value. The salience of social network externality 
effect is higher for purchase behavior in higher value product categories, 
particularly so for the salience of quality externality of social networks. 
 
Our demand model suggests five hypotheses on price dispersion. We tested 
these five hypotheses using data collected from two products in auction 
market at eBay: a low value product (the DVD box set of a TV show) and a 
high-value product (an Apple iPod). We employed three different 
econometric methods (OLS, Pooled OLS, and SUR) to conduct the testing. 
The hypotheses are well supported across both products and methods 
employed.  
 
The salience of quantity externality of social network is statistically 
significant, but its impact seems to be small. There might be several 
possibilities to explain the small empirical quantity externality effects in 
online markets. First, social network advantages may disappear rapidly as 
the quantity externality grows, a typical diminishing marginal return 
situation frequently observed in any market. If our empirical observations on 
network size go beyond a certain threshold, the point estimate of the impact 
is small. Second, there may be omission of relevant variables. For example, 
if some type of scale economies are present, making big retailers bear low 
unit costs (scale and scope economies are rather common facts in retailing), 
then the absence of a proxy for the unit cost (which is negatively correlated 
with the quantity externality) underestimates the true quantity externality 
effect. Future research is needed to investigate these possibilities. 
 
Our research can be extended in several dimensions. First, we may want to 
test our theory longitudinally across vendors. That is, collecting a sample of Social network externalities and prices dispersion in online markets 
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the auctions in which specific e-retailers have participated and then 
exploring the gains vendors enjoy as their network size increases. Second, 
we may want to extend our study across country markets. Social network 
externality may have different impacts in different cultures. Finally, our 
model posits some interesting propositions regarding the level of risk 
aversion of consumers. Indeed, if we allow for consumer heterogeneity in 
the risk aversion dimension we should find a negative price premium for risk 
lovers and a null premium for risk neutral ones. These predictions can be 
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